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Abstract
We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of
goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as capacitated and seek mechanisms that
maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive compatible, envy-free, individually
rational, and have no positive transfers.
If capacities are infinite, then sequentially repeating the 2nd price Vickrey auction meets
these requirements. In 1983, Leonard showed that for unit capacities, VCG with Clarke Pivot
payments is also envy free. For capacities that are all unit or all infinite, the mechanism produces
a Walrasian pricing (subject to capacity constraints).
Here, we consider general capacities. For homogeneous capacities (all capacities equal) we
show that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is envy free (VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is
always incentive compatible, individually rational, and has no positive transfers). Contrariwise,
there is no incentive compatible Walrasian pricing.
For heterogeneous capacities, we show that there is no mechanism with all 4 properties, but
at least in some cases, one can achieve both incentive compatibility and envy freeness.
1 Introduction
We consider settings where a set [s] = {1, . . . , s} of s goods should be allocated amongst n agents
with private valuations. An agent’s valuation function is a mapping from every subset of the
goods into the non negative reals. A mechanism receives the valuations of the agents as input,
and determines an allocation ai and a payment pi for every agent. We assume that agents have
quasi-linear utilities; that is, the utility of agent i is the difference between her valuation for the
bundle allocated to her and her payment.
We seek mechanisms that are
1. Efficient — the mechanism maximizes the sum of the valuations of the agent. Alternately,
efficient mechanisms are said to maximize social welfare.
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2. Incentive compatible (truthful) — it is a dominant strategy for agents to report their private
information [8].
3. Envy free - no agent wishes to exchange her outcome with that of another [5, 6, 16, 10, 11, 18].
4. Make no positive transfers — the payments of all agents are non-negative.
5. Individually rational for agents — no agent gets negative utility.
We use the acronyms IC, EF, NPT, and IR to denote incentive compatible, envy-free, no positive
transfers, and individually rational, respectively.
Our main results concerns the class of capacitated valuations: every agent i has an associated
capacity ci, and her value is additive up to the capacity, i.e., for every set S ⊆ [s],
vi(S) = max
∑
j∈T
vi(j)
∣∣∣T ⊆ S, |T | = ci
 ,
where vi(j) denotes the agent i’s valuation for good j.
Consider the following classes of valuation functions:
1. Gross substitutes: good x is said to be a gross substitute of good y if the demand for x is
monotonically non-decreasing with the price of y, i.e.,
∂(demand x)/∂(price y) ≥ 0 .
A valuation function is said to obey the gross substitutes condition if for every pair of goods
x and y, good x is a gross substitute of good y.
2. Subadditive valuations: A valuation v : 2[s] → R≥0 is said to be subadditive if for every two
disjoint subsets S, T ⊆ [s], v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ).
3. Superadditive valuations: A valuation v : 2[s] → R≥0 is said to be superadditive if for every
two disjoint subsets S, T ⊆ [s], v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
Capacitated valuations are a subset of gross substitutes, which are themselves a subset of
subadditive valuations.
In a Walrasian equilibrium (See [7]), prices are item prices, that is, prices are assigned to
individual goods so that every agent chooses a bundle that maximizes her utility and the market
clears. Thus, Walrasian prices automatically lead to an envy free allocation. Every Walrasian
pricing gives a mechanism that is efficient and envy free, has no positive transfers, and is individually
rational [2].
We remark that while Walrasian pricing ⇒ EF, NPT, IR, the converse is not true. Even
a mechanism that is EF, NPT, IR, and IC does not imply Walrasian prices. Note that envy
free prices may be assigned to bundles of goods which cannot necessarily be interpreted as item
prices. It is well known that in many economic settings, bundle prices are more powerful than item
prices [1, 14, 3].
Gul and Stacchetti [7] showed that every allocation problem with valuations satisfying gross
substitutes admits a Walrasian equilibrium. For the superset of gross substitutes, subadditive
valuations, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist.
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As capacitated valuations are also gross substitutes (see Theorem 2.4 in Section 2.2), it follows
that capacitated valuations always have a Walrasian equilibrium. Walrasian prices, however, may
not be incentive compatible. In fact, we show (Proposition 3.1) that even with 2 agents with
capacities 2 and 3 goods, there is no IC mechanism that produces a Walrasian equilibrium.
For superadditive valuations it is known that Walrasian equilibrium may not exist. Pa´pai [13]
has characterized the family of mechanisms that are simultaneously EF and IC under superadditive
valuations. In particular, VCG with Clarke pivot payments satisfies these conditions. However,
Pa´pai’s result for superadditive valuations does not hold for subadditive valuations. Moreover,
Clarke pivot payments do not satisfy envy freeness even for the more restricted family of capacitated
valuations, as demonstrated in the following example:
Example 1.1. Consider an allocation problem with two agents, {1, 2}, and two goods, {a, b}.
Agent 1 has capacity c1 = 1 and valuation v1(a) = v1(b) = 2, and agent 2 has capacity c2 = 2 and
valuation v2(a) = 1, v2(b) = 2. According to VCG with Clarke pivot payments, agent 1 is given
a and pays 1, while agent 2 is given b and pays nothing (as he imposes no externality on agent
1). Agent 1 would rather switch with agent 2’s allocation and payment (in which case, her utility
grows by 1), therefore, the mechanism is not envy free.
Two extremal cases of capacitated valuations are “no capacity constraints”, or, all capacities
are equal to one. If capacities are infinite, running a Vickrey 2nd price auction [17] for every good,
independently, meets all requirements (IC + Walrasian ⇒ efficient, IC, EF, NPT, IR). If all agent
capacities are one, [9] shows that VCG with Clarke pivot payments is envy free, and it is easy to see
that it also meets the stronger notion of an incentive compatible Walrasian equilibrium. For arbi-
trary capacities (not only all∞ or all ones), we distinguish between homogeneous capacities, where
all agent capacities are equal, and heterogeneous capacities, where agent capacities are arbitrary.
When considering incentive compatible and heterogeneous capacities, we distinguish between
capacitated valuations with public or private capacities: being incentive compatible with respect to
private capacities and valuation is a more difficult task than incentive compatible with respect to
valuation, where capacities are public. In this paper, we primarily consider public capacities.
The main results of this paper (which are also summarized in Figure 1) are as follows:
• For arbitrary homogeneous capacities c, such that
(c ≡ c1 = c2 = · · · = cn):
– VCG with Clarke pivot payments is efficient, IC, NPT, IR, and EF. (Section 3).
– However, there is no incentive compatible mechanism that produces Walrasian prices,
even for c = 2. (Section 3).
• For arbitrary heterogeneous capacities
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn):
– Under the VCG mechanism with Clarke Pivot payments (public capacities), a higher
capacity agent will never envy a lower capacity agent. (Section 3).
– There is no mechanism that is IC, NPT, and EF (for public and hence also for private
capacities). (Section 4).
– We also deal with some special cases:
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Subadditive Gross substitutes
capacitated -
heterogeneous
capacitated -
homogeneous
Walras.
NO
[7]
YES
[7]
(→) YES (→) YES
Walras.+IC NO (←) NO (←) NO (←) NO (Proposition 3.1)
EF + IC
?
YES for m = 2, n = 2
(Corollary 6.2)
?
(→)YES for m = 2, n = 2
?
YES for m = 2
(Prop. 5.1)
YES
(↑)
EF + IC + NPT NO (←) NO (←) NO (Theorem 4.1) YES (Corollary 3.10)
Figure 1: This table specifies the existence of a particular type of mechanism (rows) for various
families of valuation functions (columns). Efficiency is required in all entries. The valuation families
satisfy capacitated homogeneous ⊂ capacitated heterogeneous ⊂ gross substitutes ⊂ subadditive.
Wherever results are implied from other table entries, this is specified with corresponding arrows.
We note that for the family of additive valuations (no capacities), all entries are positive, as the
Clarke pivot mechanism satisfies all properties.
∗ 2 agents, public capacities - there exist mechanisms that are IC, IR, and EF. (Sec-
tion 5).
∗ 2 agents, 2 goods - there exist mechanisms that are IC, IR, and EF for every sub-
additive valuation. (Section 6).
2 Model and Preliminaries
Let [s] = {1, . . . , s} be a set of goods to be allocated to a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of agents.
An allocation a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) assigns agent i the bundle ai ⊆ [s] and is such that
⋃
i ai ⊆ [s]
and ai ∩ aj = ∅ for i 6= j.
1 We use L to denote the set of all possible allocations.
For S ⊆ [s], let vi(S) be the valuation of agent i for set S. Let v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), where vi is
the valuation function for agent i.
Let Vi be the domain of all valuation functions for agent i ∈ [n], and let V = V1×V2×· · · ×Vn.
An allocation function a : V maps v ∈ V into an allocation
a(v) = (a1(v), a2(v), . . . , an(v)) .
A payment function p : V maps v ∈ V to Rn≥0: p(v) = (p1(v), p2(v), . . . , pn(v)), where pi(v) ∈
R≥0 is the payment of agent i. Payments are from the agent to the mechanism (if the payment is
negative then this means that the transfer is from the mechanism to the agent).
A mechanism is a pair of functions, M = 〈a, p〉, where a is an allocation function, and p is
a payment function. For a valuation v, the utility to agent i in a mechanism 〈a, p〉 is defined as
vi(ai(v))− pi(v). Such a utility function is known as quasi-linear.
For a valuation v, we define (v′i, v−i) to be the valuation obtained by substituting vi by v
′
i, i.e.,
(v′i, v−i) = (v1, . . . , vi−1, v
′
i, vi+1, . . . , vn).
1Here we deal with indivisible goods, although our results also extend to divisible goods with appropriate modifi-
cations.
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A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if for all i, v, and v′i:
vi(ai(v))− pi(v) ≥ vi(ai(v
′
i, v−i))− pi(v
′
i, v−i);
this holds if and only if
pi(v) ≤ pi(v
′, v−i) +
(
vi(ai(v))− vi(ai(v
′
i, v−i))
)
. (1)
A mechanism is envy free (EF) if for all i, j ∈ [n] and all v:
vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥ vi(aj(v))− pj(v);
this holds if and only if
pi(v) ≤ pj(v) +
(
vi(ai(v))− vi(aj(v))
)
. (2)
Given valuation functions v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), a social optimum Opt is an allocation that
maximizes the sum of valuations
Opt ∈ argmax
a∈L
n∑
i=1
vi(ai) .
Likewise, the social optimum when agent i is missing, Opt−i, is the allocation
Opt−i ∈ argmax
a∈L
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
vj(aj) .
2.1 VCG mechanisms
A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is called a VCG mechanism [17, 4] if:
• a(v) = Opt, and
• pi(v) = hi(v−i)−
∑
j 6=i vj(aj(v)), where hi does not depend on vi, i ∈ [n].
For connected domains, the only efficient incentive compatible mechanism is VCG (See Theo-
rem 9.37 in [12]). Since capacitated valuations induce a connected domain, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.1. With capacitated valuations, a mechanism is efficient and IC if and only if it is
VCG.
VCG with Clarke pivot payments has
hi(v−i) = max
a∈L
∑
j 6=i
vj(a) (=
∑
j 6=i
vj(Opt
−i
j )).
Agent valuations for bundles of goods are non negative. The only mechanism that is efficient,
incentive compatible, individually rational, and with no positive transfers is VCG with Clarke pivot
payments.
The following proposition, which appears in [13], provides a criterion for the envy freeness of a
VCG mechanism.
Proposition 2.2. [13] Given a VCG mechanism, specified by functions {hi}i∈[n], agent i does not
envy agent j iff for every v,
hi(v−i)− hj(v−j) ≤ vj(Optj)− vi(Optj).
5
2.2 Gross substitutes and capacitated valuations
We define the notion of gross substitute valuations and show that every capacitated valuation
(i.e., additive up to the capacity) has the gross substitutes property. As this discussion refers to a
valuation function of a single agent, we omit the index of the agent.
Fix an agent and let D(p) be the collection of all sets of goods that maximize utility for the
agent under price vector p, D(p) = argmaxS⊆[s]{v(S)−
∑
j∈S pj}.
Definition 2.3. [7] A valuation function v : 2[s] → R≥0 satisfies the gross substitutes condition
if the following holds: Let p = (p1, . . . , ps) and q = (q1, . . . , qs) be two price vectors such that the
price for good j is no less under q than under p: i.e., qj ≥ pj, for all j. Consider the set of all items
whose price is the same under p and q, E(p, q) = {1 ≤ j ≤ s|pj = qj}, then for any S
p ∈ D(p) there
exists some Sq ∈ D(q) such that Sp ∩ E(p, q) ⊆ Sq ∩ E(p, q).
Theorem 2.4. Every capacitated valuation function (additive up to the capacity) obeys the gross
substitutes condition.
Proof. Fix a capacitated valuation v, and prices p, q such that pi ≤ qi for every good i. Fix also
some set Sp ∈ D(p). Let Spq = {i ∈ Sp : pi = qi} (= S
p ∩E(p, q)). We show that there exists a set
in D(q) that contains the set Spq.
Let Sq be an arbitrary set in D(q). Consider the following case analysis:
1. Spq ⊆ Sq: we’re done.
2. Sq ⊂ Sp but Spq 6⊆ Sq, this means that Sq is smaller than the capacity of the agent. Let
S˜q = Sq ∪ (Spq \ Sq), it follows from the optimality of Sp that for all goods j ∈ Spq (⊆ Sp),
v(j)−pj ≥ 0. Thus,the utility from S˜
q is at least equal to the utility from Sq, ergo, S˜q ∈ D(q).
3. Sq 6⊆ Sp and Spq 6⊆ Sq, : Let x = min{|Sq \ Sp|, |Spq \ Sq|}. Replace x arbitrary goods in
(Sq \ Sp) by x arbitrary goods in (Spq \ Sq), and let S˜q denote the result.
From the optimality of Sp, for every i ∈ (Spq\Sq) and j ∈ (Sq\Sp) we have v(j)−pj ≤ v(i)−pi.
Substituting pj ≤ qj and pi = qi, we get v(j)− qj ≤ v(i)− qi, and therefore the utility under
q, uq(Sq ∪ {i} \ {j}) ≥ uq(Sq).
Inductively, it holds that uq(S˜q) ≥ uq(Sq), and thus S˜q ∈ D(q). If Spq ⊆ S˜q then we’re done
as in case 1 above. Otherwise, we can apply case 2 above.
As a corollary, we get that capacitated valuations admit a Walrasian equilibrium. However, not
necessarily within an IC mechanism.
3 Envy Free and Incentive Compatible Assignments with Capac-
ities
The main result of this section is that Clarke pivot payments are envy free when capacities are
homogeneous. This follows from a stronger result, which we establish for heterogeneous capacities,
showing that with Clarke pivot payments, no agent envies a lower-capacity agent.
We first observe that one cannot aim for an incentive compatible mechanism with Walrasian
prices (if this was possible then envy freeness would follow immediately).
a b c
Agent 1 1 + ǫ 1 + ǫ 1− ǫ
Agent 2 1− ǫ/2 1 1 + ǫ
(a) Matrix v
a b c
Agent 1 1− ǫ 0 0
Agent 2 1− ǫ/2 1 1 + ǫ
(b) Matrix v′
Figure 2: No IC mechanism with Walrasian pricing for these inputs.
3.1 No Incentive Compatible Walrasian pricing
Proposition 3.1. Capacitated valuations with homogeneous capacities c ≥ 2 have no incentive
compatible mechanism which produces Walrasian prices.
Proof. Consider the valuations v given in Figure 2(a), which represents valuations for three goods
and two agents, each with capacity 2. Assume that Walrasian prices exist. I.e., for every valuation
matrix v there exist prices pa(v), pb(v), and pc(v) such that every agent chooses a bundle of maximal
utility under these prices, and this allocation maximizes social welfare. The social optimum has
Opt1(v) = {a, b}
Opt2(v) = {c}.
It follows that the price paid by agent 1 for {a, b} is
p1(v) = pa(v) + pb(v). (3)
However, it also follows from Proposition 2.1 that the only mechanism that is efficient and
incentive compatible is the VCG mechanism. Therefore, the price paid by agent 1 is also of the
following form:
p1(v) = h1(v2)− v2(Opt2(v))
= h1(v2)− v2({c}) = h1(v2)− (1 + ǫ),
for some function h1 (that does not depend on v1).
Combining Equations (3) and (4) we get that
pa(v) + pb(v) = h1(v2)− (1 + ǫ). (4)
If pa(v) < 1− ǫ/2 then agent 2 would choose good a (as agents choose bundles of maximal utility
under Walrasian pricing). As agent 2 receives Opt2 = {c} it follows that pa(v) ≥ 1− ǫ/2. Similarly,
pb(v) ≥ 1. Substituting in (4) gives
h1(v2) ≥ 3 + ǫ/2. (5)
Now consider the valuations v′ given in Figure 2(b). The social optimum here is Opt1(v
′) = {a}
and Opt2(v
′) = {b, c}. As the mechanism is VCG, the payment for agent 1 must be of the form
p1(v
′) = h1(v
′
2)− v
′
2(Opt2(v
′)) for h1 that does not depend on v
′
1. As v
′
2 = v2, we have
p1(v
′) = h1(v
′
2)− v
′
2(Opt2(v
′))
= h1(v2)− v2({b, c})
= h1(v2)− 2− ǫ
≥ 1− ǫ/2.
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The last inequality follows from Equation (5).
Under matrix v′ agent 1 gets the bundle Opt1(v
′) = {a} and hence pa(v
′) = p1(v
′) ≥ 1 − ǫ/2.
The value to agent 1 of good a is 1− ǫ. Agent 1 receives Opt1(v
′) = {a}. The utility to agent 1 is
v′1({a})− pa(v
′) ≤ (1− ǫ)− (1− ǫ/2) < 0 in contradiction to the individual rationality implied by
Walrasian pricing.
3.2 Truthful and Envy free Capacitated Allocations
The following theorem establishes a general result for capacitated valuations: in a VCG mechanism
with Clarke-pivot payments, no agent will ever envy a lower-capacity agent.
Theorem 3.2. If we apply the VCG mechanism with Clarke-pivot payments on the assignment
problem with capacitated valuations, then
• The mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational, and makes no positive transfers
(follows from VCG with CPP).
• No agent of higher capacity envies an agent of lower or equal capacity.
The input to the VCG mechanism consists of capacities and valuations. The agent capacity,
ci ≥ 0 (the capacity of agent i), is publicly known. The number of units of good j, qj ≥ 0 is also
public knowledge. The valuations — vi(j) — the value to agent i of a unit of good j, are private.
3.2.1 The b-Matching Graph
Given capacities ci, qj, and a valuation matrix v, we construct an edge-weighted bipartite graph G
as follows:
• We associate a vertex with every agent i ∈ [n] on the left, let A be the set of these vertices.
• We associate a vertex with every good j ∈ [s] on the right, let I be the set of these vertices.
• Edge (i, j), i ∈ A, j ∈ I, has weight vi(j).
• Vertex i ∈ A (associated with agent i) has degree constraint ci.
• Vertex j ∈ I (associated with good j) has degree constraint qj.
We seek an allocation a (= a(v)) where aij is the number of units of good j allocated to agent
i. The value of the allocation is v(a) =
∑
ij aijvi(j). We seek an allocation of maximal value that
meets the degree constraints:
∑
j aij ≤ ci,
∑
i aij ≤ qj, this is known as a b-matching problem and
has an integral solution if all constraints are integral, see [15]. Let ai = (ai1, ai2, . . . , ain) denote
the i’th row of a, which corresponds to the bundle allocated to agent i.
Let vk(ai) =
∑
j∈[s] aijvk(j) denote the value to agent k of bundle ai. Let M denote some
allocation that attains the maximal social value, M ∈ argmaxa v(a). Finally, let G
−i be the graph
derived from G by removing the vertex associated with agent i and all its incident edges, and let
M−i be a matching of maximal social value with agent i removed.
Specializing the Clarke-pivot rule to our setting, the payment of agent k is
pk = v(M
−k)− v(M) + vk(Mk) . (6)
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In the special case of permutation games (the number of agents and goods is equal, and every
agent can receive at most one good), the social optimum corresponds to a maximum weighted
matching in G. Permutation games were first studied by [9] who showed that Clarke-pivot payments
are envy free. However, the shadow variables technique used in this proof does not seem to generalize
for larger capacities.
Remark: Our proof is given in terms of fractional allocations (where aij ≥ 0,
∑
j aij ≤ ci,∑
i aij ≤ qj) but also holds for integral allocations (where aij ∈ Z≥0,
∑
j aij ≤ ci,
∑
i aij ≤ qj).
This is because when capacities and quantities are integral, there is always an integral social
optimum.
Proof. Let agent 1 and agent 2 be two arbitrary agents such that c1 ≥ c2. Agent 1 does not envy
agent 2 if and only if
v1(M1)− p1 ≥ v1(M2)− p2
By substituting the Clarke pivot payments (6) and rearranging, this is true if and only if
v(M−2) ≥ v(M−1) + v1(M2)− v2(M2). (7)
Thus in order to prove the theorem we need to establish (7).
We construct a new allocation D−2 on G−2 (from the allocations M and M−1) such that
v(D−2) ≥ v(M−1) + v1(M2)− v2(M2) . (8)
From the optimality of M−2, it must hold that v(M−2) ≥ v(D−2). Combining this with (8) shall
establish (7), as required.
In what follows we make several preparations for the construction of the allocation D−2. Given
M and M−1, we construct a directed bipartite graph Gf on A∪I coupled with a flow f as follows.
For every pair of vertices i ∈ A and j ∈ I,
• If Mij −M
−1
ij > 0, then Gf includes arc i→ j with flow fi→j =Mij −M
−1
ij .
• If Mij −M
−1
ij < 0, then Gf includes arc j → i with flow fj→i =M
−1
ij −Mij .
• If Mij =M
−1
ij , then Gf contains neither arc i→ j nor arc j → i.
We define the excess of a vertex in Gf to be the difference between the amount of flow flowing
out of the vertex and the amount of flow flowing into the vertex. I.e., the excess χi of a vertex
i ∈ A in Gf is
χi =
∑
(i→j)∈Gf
fi→j −
∑
(j→i)∈Gf
fj→i =
∑
j
(
Mij −M
−1
ij
)
,
and the excess χj of a vertex j ∈ I in Gf is
χj =
∑
(j→i)∈Gf
fj→i −
∑
(i→j)∈Gf
fi→j =
∑
i
(
M−1ij −Mij
)
.
Clearly the sum of all excesses is zero.
A vertex is said to be a source if its excess is positive, and said to be a target if its excess is
negative. The aforementioned definitions imply the following observation.
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Observation 3.3. To summarize,
0 ≤
∑
j
M−1ij + |χi| =
∑
j
Mij ≤ ci ∀ source i ∈ A. (9)
0 ≤
∑
j
Mij + |χi| =
∑
j
M−1ij ≤ ci ∀ target i ∈ A. (10)
0 ≤
∑
i
Mij + |χj| =
∑
i
M−1ij ≤ qj ∀ source j ∈ I. (11)
0 ≤
∑
i
M−1ij + |χj| =
∑
i
Mij ≤ qj ∀ target j ∈ I. (12)
Using the flow decomposition theorem, we can decompose the flow f into simple paths and
cycles, where each path connects a source to a target. Associated with each path and cycle T is a
positive flow value f(T ) > 0. Given an arc x→ y, fx→y is obtained by summing up the values f(T )
of all paths and cycles T that contain x→ y. Notice that M−11j = 0 for all j and therefore f1→j ≥ 0
for all j. It follows that there are no arcs of the form j → 1 in Gf . The following observation can
be easily verified.
Observation 3.4. For each path P = u1, u2, . . . , ut in a flow decomposition of Gf , where u1 is a
source and ut is a target, it holds that f(P ) ≤ min{χu1 , |χut |}.
We define the value of a path or a cycle T = u1, u2, . . . , ut in Gf , to be
v(P ) =
∑
ui ∈ A,
ui+1 ∈ I
vui(ui+1)−
∑
ui ∈ I,
ui+1 ∈ A
vui+1(ui).
It is easy to verify that
∑
T f(T ) · v(T ) = v(M)− v(M
−1), where we sum over all paths and cycles
T in our decomposition.
We will repeatedly do the following procedure: Let M , M−1, f and Gf be as above.
Lemma 3.5. Let T = u1, u2, . . . , ut be a cycle in Gf or a path in the flow decomposition of Gf ,
and let ǫ be the minimal flow along any arc of T . We construct an allocation M̂ (= M̂(T )) from
M by canceling the flow along T , start with M̂ =M and then for each (ui, ui+1) ∈ T set:
M̂uiui+1 = Muiui+1 − ǫ ui ∈ A, ui+1 ∈ I
M̂ui+1ui = Mui+1ui + ǫ ui ∈ I, ui+1 ∈ A .
Alternatively, we construct M̂−1 (= M̂−1(T )) from M−1, starting from M̂−1 =M−1 and then for
each (ui, ui+1) ∈ T set
M̂−1uiui+1 = M
−1
uiui+1
+ ǫ ui ∈ A, ui+1 ∈ I,
M̂−1ui+1ui = M
−1
ui+1ui
− ǫ ui ∈ I, ui+1 ∈ A.
The allocations M̂ , M̂−1 are valid (do not violate capacity constraints).
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Proof. If T is a cycle then our manipulations do not affect the total quantity allocated to an agent,
nor the total demand for a good.
If T is a path, then our manipulations do not affect the quantities/demands for all internal
vertices, i.e., it is sufficient to show that the capacities/demands of u1 and ut are not exceeded.
It follows from Observation 3.4 that the flow along a path T , f(T ) ≤ min{χu1 , |χut |}.
Consider the first vertex along T , u1, if u1 is an agent, then by Observation 3.3 it holds that∑
j
M−1u1j ≤ cu1 − |χu1 | ≤ cu1 − ǫ.
Thus we can increase the allocation of M−1u1u2 by ǫ, while not exceeding the capacity of agent u1
(cu1). If u1 is a good, agent u2 can release ǫ units of good u1 without violating any capacity
constraints. For vertex ut, we can follow a similar argument and use Observation 3.3 to show that
the capacity constraint of ut is not violated either.
The remainder of the proof requires several preparations that are cast in the following lemmata.
Lemma 3.6. It is without loss of generality to assume that M−1 is such that
1. There are no cycles of zero value in Gf .
2. There is no path P = u1, u2, . . . , ut of zero value such that u1 6= 1 is a source and ut is a
target.
Proof. Assume that there is a cycle or a path T in the flow decomposition of Gf such that v(T ) = 0.
Let ǫ be the smallest flow along an arc e of T . Let M̂−1 = M̂−1(T ) as in Lemma 3.5, it follows
from the Lemma that M̂−1 is a valid assignment.
Furthermore, v(M̂−1) = v(M−1) − xv(T ) = v(M−1) and if we replace M−1 by M̂−1 then the
new Gf (for M and M̂
−1) is derived from the old Gf (for M and M
−1) by decreasing the flow
along every arc of T by ǫ, and removing arcs whose flow is zero. In particular, at least one arc will
be removed and no new arcs added. We repeat this process until Gf does not contain any cycle or
path of zero value, as required.
Thus, in the sequel we assume that M−1 satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.62.
Lemma 3.7. The graph Gf does not contain a cycle.
Proof. Assume that Gf contains a cycle C which carries ǫ > 0 flow.
If v(C) < 0, let M̂ = M̂(C). According to Lemma 3.5, M̂ is a valid assignment. The value of
M̂ is
v(M̂ ) = v(M) − ǫv(C) > v(M) ,
which contradicts the maximality of M .
If v(C) > 0, let M̂−1 = M̂−1(C). According to Lemma 3.5, M̂−1 is a valid assignment. We
now show that M̂−1 allocates nothing to agent 1. For there to be an edge j → 1 in Gf , it must be
that M1j −M
−1
1j < 0, but M1j ≥ 0 and M
−1 does not contain agent 1 at all so M−11j = 0. It follows
2Since Inequality (8) depends only on the value of M−1 it does not matter which M−1 we work with.
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that agent 1 has no incoming flow in Gf , and thus cannot be part of any cycle. The value of M̂
−1
is
v(M̂−1) = v(M−1) + ǫv(C) > v(M−1) ,
which contradicts the maximality of M−1.
Also, by Lemma 3.6, there are no cycles of value zero in Gf and this concludes the proof.
In particular, Lemma 3.7 implies that there are no cycles in our flow decomposition. We next
show that the only source vertex in Gf is the vertex corresponding to agent 1.
Lemma 3.8. The vertex that corresponds to agent 1 is the unique source vertex.
Proof. Proof via reduco ad absurdum. Consider the graph Gf , let u1 6= 1 be a source vertex, ut a
target vertex, and, by assumption, let P = u1, u2, . . . ut, be some path in Gf with flow ǫ > 0. Since
the vertex corresponding to agent 1 has no incoming arcs, P does not contain vertex 1. According
to Lemma 3.6, such a path P cannot have value zero.
According to Lemma 3.5, the allocations M̂−1 = M̂−1(P ) and M̂(P ) are valid (preserve capacity
constraints).
Consider the following two cases.
case a: v(P ) > 0. It follows that
v(M̂−1) = v(M−1) + ǫv(P ) > v(M−1).
case b: v(P ) < 0. It follow that
v(M̂ ) = v(M)− ǫv(P ) > v(M).
In both cases we’ve reached contradiction, either to the optimality of M−1 (case a) or to the
optimality of M (case b).
Lemma 3.8 implies that all the paths in our flow decomposition originate at agent 1. We are
now ready to describe the construction of the allocation D−2:
1. Stage I: initially, D−2 :=M−1.
2. Stage II: for every good j, let x = min{M2j ,M
−1
2j }, and set D
−2
2j :=M
−1
2j − x and D
−2
1j := x.
3. Stage III: for every flow path P in the flow decomposition of Gf that contains agent 2, let Pˆ be
the prefix of P up to agent 2. For every agent to good arc (i→ j) ∈ Pˆ set D−2ij := D
−2
ij +f(P ),
and for every good to agent arc (j → i) ∈ Pˆ set D−2ij := D
−2
ij − f(P ).
It is easy to verify that D−2 indeed does not allocate any good to agent 2. Also, the allocation to
agent 1 in D−2 is of the same size as the allocation to agent 2 in M−1. Since c1 ≥ c2, D
−2 is a
valid allocation.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 3.2 we now show that:
Lemma 3.9. Allocation D−2 satisfies (8).
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Proof. Rearranging (8), we obtain
v(D−2) ≥ v(M−1) (13)
+
s∑
j=1
(v1(j)− v2(j)) ·min(M2j ,M
−1
2j ) (14)
+
∑
j:M2j>M
−1
2j
(v1(j) − v2(j)) (M2j −M
−1
2j ). (15)
At the end of stage I, we have D−2 = M−1 and so the inequality above at line (13) (Excluding
expressions (14) and (15)) holds trivially. It is also easy to verify that at the end of stage II, the
inequality above that spans expressions (13) and (14) (and excludes expression (15)) holds. What
we show next is that at the end of stage III, the full inequality above will hold.
Consider a good j such that M2j > M
−1
2j . In Gf we have an arc 2 → j such that f2→j =
M2j −M
−1
2j , therefore in the flow decomposition we must have paths P1, . . . , Pℓ, all containing the
arc 2→ j, such that
ℓ∑
k=1
f(Pk) = f2→j =M2j −M
−1
2j . (16)
For every k = 1, . . . , ℓ, let P̂k denote the prefix of Pk up to agent 2. Consider the cycle C
consisting of P̂k followed by arcs 2 → j and j → 1. We claim that the value of this cycle is
non-negative.
Consider the allocation M̂(C) which is a valid allocation from Lemma 3.5. Observe that
v(M̂ ) = v(M)− ǫv(C) > v(M). This now contradicts the assumption that M maximizes v over all
allocations. We obtain
v(P̂k) + v2(j) − v1(j) ≥ 0.
Rearranging and multiplying by f(Pk), it follows that
f(Pk)v(P̂k) ≥ f(Pk) (v1(j)− v2(j)) .
Summing over all paths k = 1, . . . , ℓ, we get
ℓ∑
k=1
(
f(Pk)v(P̂k)
)
≥ (v1(j) − v2(j))
ℓ∑
k=1
f(Pk).
Substituting (16) in the last inequality establishes the following inequality:
ℓ∑
k=1
(
f(Pk)v(P̂k)
)
≥
(
v1(j)− v2(j)
)(
M2j −M
−1
2j
)
. (17)
The left hand side of (17) is exactly the gain in value of the allocation when applying stage
III to the paths P̂1, . . . , P̂ℓ during the construction of D
−2 above. The right hand side is the term
which we add in (15).
To conclude the proof of Lemma 3.9, we note that stage III may also deal with other paths
that start at agent 1 and terminate at agent 2. Such paths must have non-negative value and
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thus can only increase the value of D−2. Otherwise we can construct an allocation M˜ , such that
v(M˜ ) > v(M) by decreasing Mij by ǫ for every arc (i → j) ∈ P and increasing Mij by ǫ for
every arc (j → i) ∈ P as we did constructing M̂ in Lemma 3.5. The allocation M˜ is valid since
it preserves capacities of vertices that are internal on the path and decreases only arcs with flow
on them, Mij > ǫ. Finally, the capacity of a source agent vertex can be increased according to
Observation 3.3.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
The following is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.10. If all agent capacities are equal, then the VCG allocation with Clarke-pivot
payments is EF.
4 Heterogeneous Capacities: IC + EF imply Positive Transfers
Do Clarke-pivot payments work also under heterogeneous capacities? The answer is no, as demon-
strated in Example 1.1. In this section we prove a stronger result, showing that any mechanism
that is both incentive compatible and envy-free for heterogeneous capacities must have positive
transfers. We remark that IC, NPT, and IR ⇔ Clarke-pivot payments, which, along with Ex-
ample 1.1 implies that one cannot have an efficient mechanism that is IC, NPT, IR, and EF for
heterogeneous capacities, here we prove that even without the individual rationality requirement,
this is impossible.
Theorem 4.1. Consider capacitated valuations with heterogeneous capacities such that the num-
ber of goods exceeds the smallest agent capacity. There is no mechanism that is simultaneously
efficient, IC, EF, and has no positive transfers. That is, any IC and EF efficient mechanism has
some valuations v for which the mechanism pays an agent.
Remark: Note that the conditions on the capacities of the agents and the number of goods
are necessary. If capacities are homogeneous or the total supply of goods is at most the minimum
agent capacity, then Clarke-pivot payments, that are known to be incentive compatible, individually
rational, and have no positive transfers, are also envy-free.
Proof. We start with a warm-up of capacitated valuations with two agents and two goods where
agent i = 1, 2 has capacity i. We then generalize the proof to arbitrary heterogeneous settings. To
ease the notation we abbreviate vi(j) to vij.
Two agents and two goods:
One can easily verify that the social optimum is as follows. (we omit cases with ties).3
• If v21 > v11 and v22 > v12, then Opt2 = {1, 2} and Opt1 = ∅. We refer to this class of
valuations as class A.
3The social optimum is unique when there are no ties. Valuations v’s with ties form a lower dimensional measure
0 set. It suffices to consider valuations without ties for both existence or non-existence claims of IC or EF payments.
This is clear for non-existence, for existence, the payments for a v with ties is defined as the limit when we approach
this point through v’s without ties that result in the same allocation. Clearly IC and EF properties carry over, also
IR and NPT.
14
• If v11 − v21 > max{0, v12 − v22}, then Opt1 = {1} and Opt2 = {2}. We refer to this class of
valuations as class B1.
• If v12 − v22 > max{0, v11 − v21}, then Opt1 = {2} and Opt2 = {1}. We refer to this class of
valuations as class B2.
x+ 3ǫ x+ ǫ
0 0
(a)
x+ 3ǫ x+ ǫ
x+ ǫ x
(b)
0 0
x+ ǫ x
(c)
Figure 3: These matrices correspond to three valuation profiles, where in each matrix the rows correspond
to the agents and the columns correspond to goods. The valuations in matrices (a) and (b) belong to class
B1, and the valuation in matrix (c) belongs to class A.
Substituting the above in Proposition 2.2 we obtain that for v ∈ B1, agent 1 does not envy
agent 2 if and only if
h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2) = v22 − v12 , (18)
and agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if
h2(v1)− h1(v2) ≤ v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1) = v11 − v21 . (19)
Fix an ǫ > 0, and some x > 0, and consider the valuation v where v11 = x+3ǫ, v12 = x+ ǫ and
v21 = v22 = 0 (see Figure 4(a)). This valuation is clearly in B1. Substituting in (19), agent 2 does
not envy agent 1 in v if and only if
− (x+ 3ǫ) ≤ h1(0, 0) − h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ). (20)
Next consider the valuation v where v11 = x + 3ǫ, v12 = x + ǫ, v21 = x + ǫ, and v22 = x (see
Figure 4(b)). This valuation is clearly in B1 as well. Substituting in (18), agent 1 does not envy
agent 2 in v if and only if
h1(x+ ǫ, x)− h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ x− (x+ ǫ) = −ǫ. (21)
Combining (20) and (21), it follows that
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≤ h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ)− ǫ ≤ h1(0, 0) + x+ 2ǫ (22)
The no positive transfers requirement states that for any v, pi ≥ 0 for every i; in particular,
p1 = h1(v2)− v2(Opt2) ≥ 0; i.e.,
h1(v2) ≥ v2(Opt2) . (23)
Finally, consider the valuations v where v11 = v12 = 0, v21 = x+ǫ, and v22 = x (see Figure 4(c)).
Clearly, the optimal allocation is one in which agent 2 gets both goods, thus v ∈ A and v2(Opt2) =
2x + ǫ. From (22) it follows that h1(x + ǫ, x) ≤ h1(0, 0) + x + 2ǫ. From (23) it follows that
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≥ v2(Opt2) = 2x+ ǫ. Combining we obtain h1(0, 0) ≥ x− ǫ. However, h1(0, 0) cannot
be a function of x; in particular if h1(0, 0) < x− ǫ, then we obtain a contradiction.
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This simple case gives us essentially all the intuition and structure that is required for solving
the general case.
Heterogeneous capacities, multiple agents and goods:
Let c be the smallest agent capacity and rename the agents such that c is the capacity of agent
1, and the capacity of agent 2 is strictly greater than c. Consider an instance with at least c + 1
goods, and valuation functions satisfying vij = 0 if i > 2 or j > c + 1, and vij = vij′ for i = 1, 2
and every 2 ≤ j, j′ ≤ c+ 1.
It is easy to verify that an optimal allocation Opt is obtained as follows (where we omit cases
with ties and only define the allocation of goods j = 1, . . . , c+ 1).
• If v21 > v11 and v22 > v12, then Opt2 = {1, . . . , c + 1} and Opt1 = ∅. We refer to this class
of valuations as class A.
• If v11 > v21 and v12 < v22, then Opt1 = {1} and Opt2 = {2, . . . , c+ 1}. We refer to this class
of valuations as class B1.
• If v11 − v21 > v12 − v22 and v12 > v22, then Opt1 = {1, . . . , c} and Opt2 = {c + 1}. We refer
to this class of valuations as class B+1 .
• If v12− v22 > max{0, v11 − v21}, then Opt2 = {1} and Opt1 = {2, . . . , c+1}. We refer to this
class of valuations as class B2.
Substituting the above in proposition 2.2 we obtain that for v ∈ B+1 , agent 1 does not envy
agent 2 if and only if
h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2) = v22 − v12 , (24)
and agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if
h2(v1)− h1(v2) ≤ v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1)
= v11 + (c− 1)v12 − v21 − (c− 1)v22 . (25)
Fix an ǫ > 0 and some x > 0, and consider the valuation v where v11 = x+ 3ǫ, v1j = x+ ǫ for
j = 2, . . . , c+ 1, and v2j = 0 for j = 2, . . . , c+ 1. This valuation is clearly in B
+
1 . Substituting the
corresponding values in (25) we obtain that agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if
− cx− (c+ 2)ǫ ≤ h1(0, 0) − h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) . (26)
Next consider the valuation v where v11 = x+3ǫ, v1j = x+ǫ for j = 2, . . . , c+1, v21 = x+ǫ, and
v2j = x for j = 2, . . . , c+1. This valuation is clearly in B
+
1 as well. Substituting the corresponding
values in (24) we obtain that agent 1 does not envy agent 2 if and only if
h1(x+ ǫ, x)− h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ −ǫ . (27)
Combining (26) and (27) we obtain,
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≤ h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ)− ǫ
≤ h1(0, 0) + cx+ (c+ 2)ǫ− ǫ
= h1(0, 0) + cx+ (c+ 1)ǫ. (28)
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Finally, consider the valuations v where v11 = v1j = 0 for j = 2, . . . , c + 1, v21 = x + ǫ, and
v2j = x for j = 2, . . . , c + 1. Clearly, the optimal allocation is one in which agent 2 gets all
c + 1 goods, thus v ∈ A and v2(Opt2) = (c + 1)x + ǫ. From (28) it follows that h1(x + ǫ, x) ≤
h1(0, 0) + cx + (c + 1)ǫ. In order to satisfy no positive transfers, according to (23), it holds that
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≥ v2(Opt2) = (c + 1)x + ǫ. Combining we obtain h1(0, 0) ≥ x− cǫ. However, h1(0, 0)
cannot be a function of x and c; in particular if h1(0, 0) < x− cǫ, then we obtain a contradiction.
5 IC+EF mechanism for capacitated valuations with two agents
In the previous section we showed that it is impossible to satisfy EF, IC and NPT simultaneously.
Here we show that if we forego the NPT requirement, then capacitated valuations with two agents
(and arbitrary capacities and number of goods) admits a mechanism which satisfies the other two
properties as well as IR.
Proposition 5.1. 2-agents capacitated valuations admit a mechanism that is simultaneously IC,
EF and IR.
Proof. Let ci be the capacity of agent i and assume without loss of generality that c1 ≤ c2. Given
a vector (x1, x2 . . .) let topb{x} be the set of the b largest entries in x.
We show that
h1(v2) =
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j and h2(v1) =
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j (29)
give VCG payments which are envy-free.
By Proposition 2.2, it is sufficient to show that for i = 1, j = 2 and for i = 2, j = 1 it holds that
hi(vj)− hj(vi) ≤ vj(Optj)− vi(Optj) . By substituting h1 and h2 from (29), this is equivalent to∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j ≤ v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2) (30)
and ∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j −
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j ≤ v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1). (31)
Assume first that the number of goods is exactly c1+ c2. Clearly, in the optimal solution, agent
1 will get the c1 goods that maximize v1j − v2j and agent 2 will get the c2 goods that minimize this
difference.
We first establish (31):∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j −
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j ≤
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
(v1j − v2j)
≤
∑
j∈topc1{v1−v2}
(v1j − v2j)
=
∑
j∈Opt1
(v1j − v2j)
= v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1)
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where the inequalities follow by the fact that for every vi ∈ R
s
≥0 and S ⊂ [s], it holds that∑
j∈top|S|{vi}
vij ≥
∑
j∈S
vij . (32)
In what follows we establish (30). We use the following additional notation: for a subset Y
of entries, let topb{x|Y } denote the set of b largest entries in x projected on Y . In addition, let
S = topc1{v2}∩ (Opt2 \ topc1{v1|Opt2}); i.e., S is the (possibly empty) set of goods that are among
the top c1 goods for v2, are also in Opt2, but are not among the top c1 goods for v1 in Opt2.
v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2) =
∑
j∈Opt2
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
v1j
=
∑
j∈Opt2\topc1{v1|Opt2}
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
(v2j − v1j)
≥
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
(v2j − v1j)
≡
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
(v2j − v1j). (33)
Let S′ be a set of |S| goods from Opt1 ∪ topc1{v1|Opt2} which are not contained in topc1{v2}.
Such a set always exists because there are 2c1 goods in Opt1 ∪ topc1{v1|Opt2}, and exactly c1− |S|
of them are in topc1{v2}, and therefore we have c1 + |S| goods to choose S
′ from. Therefore, in
order to establish (30), it suffices to show that∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
(v2j − v1j) ≥
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j .
This is established in what follows.∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j =
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v2}\S
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j
≤
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈S′∪topc1{v2}\S
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j
≤
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈S′∪topc1{v2}\S
(v2j − v1j) (34)
≤
∑
j∈S
v2j +
∑
j∈topc1{v1|Opt2}
(v2j − v1j) (35)
Inequality (34) follows from Equation (32) since S′∪ topc1{v2}\S by definition contains exactly
c1 goods. Finally, to establish Inequality (35), observe that all the goods in topc1{v1|Opt2} belong
to Opt2, while all the goods that belong to S
′ ∪ topc1{v2} \ S but not to topc1{v1|Opt2} belong to
Opt1. Recalling that v2j − v1j ≥ v2j′ − v1j′ for every j ∈ Opt2, j
′ ∈ Opt1 concludes the derivation
of the inequality.
It remains to analyze the cases where the number of goods is different than c1 + c2. If the
number of goods is less than c1 + c2, then consider a set D of “dummy” goods that are added to
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the set of “real” goods, such that v1j = v2j = 0 for every j ∈ D. These dummy goods do not
change the optimal allocation projected on the real goods, and for every agent and every bundle,
the valuation of the agent to the bundle is equal to her valuation for the set of real goods in the
bundle. In addition, the values of h1 and h2 are also equal to their values as defined with respect
to the real goods alone. Therefore, the aforementioned argument (for the case of c1+ c2 goods) can
be applied here as well.
We next consider the case in which there are more than c1 + c2 goods. Observe that all the
goods involved in Equations (30) and (31) participate in the optimal solution (as topc2{v2} and
topc1{v1} must both be included in the optimal solution). Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the
set of c1 + c2 goods that participate in the optimal solution.
6 Subadditive Valuations: IC+EF mechanism for two agents and
two goods
In previous sections we restricted attention to capacitated valuations. Here, we turn to the more
general family of subadditive valuations, but restrict attention to the case of two agents and two
goods. For this case, we construct a mechanism that is simultaneously IC, EF and IR. This is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. For any subadditive allocation setting with two agents and two goods, a VCG
mechanism with the following h1, h2 functions is envy free and individually rational:
h1(v2) = max(v2({1}), v2({2}))
h2(v1) = max(v1({1}), v1({2}))
Proof. By Proposition 2.2, a VCG mechanism is envy free if and only if
h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2), and (36)
h2(v1)− h1(v2) ≤ v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1). (37)
The only possible allocations are both goods allocated to same agent or each agent gets one
good. Wlog., we can assume that good 2 is allocated to agent 2.
Case 1: Opt2 = {1, 2}, Opt1 = ∅.
Case 2: Opt2 = {2}, Opt1 = {1}.
We establish via case analysis that (36) and (37) hold in these two cases. To simplify presen-
tation we use vi(1), vi(2), vi(1, 2) when we refer to vi({1}), vi({2}), and vi({1, 2}) respectively. In
addition, we use max vi and min vi to denote max{vi(1), vi(2)} and min{vi(1), vi(2)} for every agent
i.
Establishing (36) for Case 1: From subadditivity,
v1(1, 2) ≤ v1(1) + v1(2) = max v1 +min v1.
From optimality,
v2(1, 2) ≥ max{v1(1) + v2(2), v1(2) + v2(1)} ≥ max v2 +min v1.
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Combining,
v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2) = v2(1, 2) − v1(1, 2)
≥ max v2 +min v1 −max v1 −min v1
= max v2 −max v1 = h1(v2)− h2(v1)
Establishing (37) for Case 1:
From subadditivity,
v2(1, 2) ≤ v2(1) + v2(2) = max v2 +min v2.
From optimality,
v2(1, 2) ≥ max{v1(1) + v2(2), v1(2) + v2(1)} ≥ max v1 +min v2.
Combining together, we get max v2 ≥ max v1 and therefore,
h2(v1)− h1(v2) = max v1 −max v2 ≤ 0 = v1(Opt1)− v2(Opt1).
Establishing (36) for Case 2: We need to show, that
v2(Opt2)− v1(Opt2)− (h1(v2)− h2(v1)) = v2(2) − v1(2)−max v2 +max v1 ≥ 0.
If max v2 = v2(2), then the above inequality trivially holds. If max v2 = v2(1), then the above
inequality follows from optimality of allocation, v2(2) + v1(1) ≥ v1(2) + v2(1).
We omit the proof of (37) for Case 2 since it is similar to (36) for Case 2.
This establishes the assertion of the proposition.
Recall that the valuation of an agent i for bundle B is defined as vi(B) ≡
∑
j∈topci{vi|B}
vij ,
which is a special case of subadditive valuations. The following is, therefore, a direct corollary of
Proposition 6.1.
Corollary 6.2. For capacitated valuations (public or private) with 2-agent and 2-goods, the VCG
mechanism with the following h1, h2 functions is EF and IC:
h1(v2, c2) =
{
max(v21, v22) c2 ∈ {1, 2}
0 c2 = 0
h2(v1, c1) =
{
max(v11, v12) c1 ∈ {1, 2}
0 c1 = 0
Remark: Note that with two goods, all ci ≥ 2 are equivalent, therefore it is sufficient to consider
capacities ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
7 Discussion and open problems
This work initiates the study of efficient, incentive compatible, and envy free mechanisms for
capacitated valuations.
Our work suggests a host of problems for future research on heterogeneous capacitated valua-
tions and generalizations thereof.
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We know that, generally, there may be no mechanism that is both IC and EF even if we allow
positive transfers 4.
First, is there a mechanism for games with more than two agents that is efficient, IC, and EF ?
We conjecture that such mechanisms do exist and believe this is also the case for any combinatorial
auction with subadditive valuations (which generalizes capacitated valuations with private or public
capacities). We provided such mechanisms for capacitated valuations with two agents (public
capacities) and for subadditive valuations with two agents and two goods.
Second, our work focused on efficient mechanisms; i.e., ones that maximize social welfare. A
natural question is how well the optimal social welfare can be approximated by a mechanism that
is IC, EF, and NPT.
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Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games
Edith Cohen∗ Michal Feldman† Amos Fiat‡ Haim Kaplan § Svetlana Olonetsky¶
Abstract
We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of items they
may receive. We refer to this setting as capacitated allocation games. We seek truthful and envy free
mechanisms that maximize the social welfare. I.e., where agents have no incentive to lie and no agent
seeks to exchange outcomes with another.
In 1983, Leonard showed that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments (which is known to be truthful,
individually rational, and have no positive transfers), is also an envy free mechanism for the special case
of n items and n unit capacity agents. We elaborate upon this problem and show that VCG with Clarke
Pivot payments is envy free if agent capacities are all equal. When agent capacities are not identical, we
show that there is no truthful and envy free mechanism that maximizes social welfare if one disallows
positive transfers.
For the case of two agents (and arbitrary capacities) we show a VCG mechanism that is truthful, envy
free, and individually rational, but has positive transfers. We conclude with a host of open problems that
arise from our work.
1 Introduction
We consider allocation problems where a set of objects is to be allocated amongst m agents, where every
agent has an additive and non negative valuation function. We study mechanisms that are truthful, envy free,
and maximize the social welfare (sum of valuations). The utility of an agent i is the valuation of the bundle
assigned to i, vi(OPT), minus any payment, pi.
A mechanism is incentive compatible (or truthful) if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report
her private information truthfully [4]. A mechanism is envy-free if no agent wishes to switch her outcome
with that of another [1, 2, 9, 6, 7, 10].
Any allocation that maximizes the social welfare has payments that make it truthful — in particular —
any payment of the form
pi = hi(t
−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(OPT) (1)
where OPT is an allocation maximizing the social welfare and t−i are the types of all agents but agent i.
Similarly, any allocation that maximizes the social welfare has payments that make it envy free, this follows
from a characterization of envy free allocations (see [3]). Unfortunately, the set of payments that make the
mechanism truthful, and the set of payments that make the mechanism envy free, need not intersect. In this
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†School of Business Administration and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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paper we seek such payments, i.e., payments that make the mechanism simultaneously truthful and envy
free.
An example of a mechanism that is simultaneously truthful and envy free is the Vickrey 2nd price
auction. Applying the 2nd price auction to an allocation problem assigns items successively, every item
going to the agent with the highest valuation to the item at a price equal to the 2nd highest valuation. If, for
example, for all items, agent i has maximal valuation, then agent i will receive all items.
Leonard [5] considered the problem of assigning people to jobs, n people to n positions, and called
this problem the permutation game. The Vickrey 2nd price auction is irrelevant in this setting because no
person can be assigned to more than one position. Leonard showed that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is
simultaneously truthful and envy free. Under Clarke Pivot payments, agents internalize their externalities,
i.e.,
hi(t
−i) =
∑
j 6=i
vj(OPT−i) (2)
where OPT−i is the optimal allocation if there was no agent i. By substituting
∑
j 6=i vj(OPT−i) for hi(t−i)
in Equation 1 one can interpret Clarke Pivot payments as though an agent pays for how much others lose by
her presence, i.e., the agent internalizes her externalities.
Motivated by the permutation game, we consider a more general capacitated allocation problem where
agents have associated capacities. Agent i has capacity Ui and cannot be assigned more than Ui items.
Like Leonard, we seek a mechanism that is simultaneously truthful and envy free. The private types we
consider may include both the valuation and the capacity (private valuations and private capacities) or only
the valuation (private valuations, public capacity). Leonard’s proof uses LP duality and it is not obvious
how to extend it to more general settings.
Before we address this question, one needs to ask what does it mean for one agent to envy another when
they have different capacities? A lower capacity agent may be unable to switch allocations with a higher
capacity agent. To deal with this issue, we allow agent i, with capacity less than that of agent i′ to choose
whatever items she desires from the i′ bundle, up to her capacity. I.e., we say that agent i envies agent i′
if agent i prefers a subset of the allocation to agent i′, along with the price set for agent i′, over her own
allocation and price.
The VCG mechanism (obey Equation 1) is always truthful. In fact, any truthful mechanisms that choose
the socially optimal allocation in capacitated allocation problems must be VCG [8]. We obtain the following:
1. For agents with private valuations and either private or public capacities, under the VCG mechanism
with Clarke Pivot payments, a higher capacity agent will never envy a lower capacity agent. In
particular, if all capacities are equal then the mechanism is envy free. (See Section 3).
2. For agents with private valuations, and either private or public capacities, any envy free VCG payment
must allow positive transfers. (See Section 4).
3. For two agents with private valuations and arbitrary public capacities, there exist VCG payments such
that the mechanism is envy free. It follows that such payments must allow positive transfers. (See
Section 5).
4. For two agents with private valuations and private capacities, and for two items, there exist VCG
payments such that the mechanism is envy free. (See Section 6).
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2 Preliminaries
Let U be a set of objects, and let vi be a valuation function associated with agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, that maps
sets of objects into ℜ. We denote by v a sequence < v1, v2, . . . , vm > of valuation functions one for each
agent.
An allocation function1 amaps a sequence of valuation functions v =< v1, v2, . . . , vm > into a partition
of U consisting of m parts, one for each agent. I.e.,
a(v) =< a1(v), a2(v), . . . , am(v) >,
where ∪iai(v) ⊆ U and ai(v) ∩ aj(v) = ∅ for i 6= j. A payment function2 is a mapping from v to ℜm,
p(v) =< p1(v), p2(v), . . . , pm(v) >, pi(v) ∈ ℜ. We assume that payments are from the agent to the
mechanism (if the payment is negative then this means that the transfer is from the mechanism to the agent).
A mechanism is a pair of functions, M = 〈a, p〉, where a is an allocation function, and p is a payment
function. For a sequence of valuation functions v = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vm〉, the utility to agent i is defined as
vi(ai(v))− pi(v). Such a utility function is known as quasi-linear.
Let v =< v1, v2, . . . , vm > be a sequence of valuations, we define (v′i, v−i) to be the sequence of
valuation functions arrived by substituting vi by v′i, i.e.,
(v′i, v
−i) =< v1, . . . , vi−1, v
′
i, vi+1, . . . , vm > .
We next define mechanisms that are incentive compatible, envy-free, and both incentive compatible and
envy-free.
• A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to reveal her
true valuation function to the mechanism. I.e., if for all i, v, and v′i:
vi(ai(v))− pi(v) ≥ vi(ai(v
′
i, v
−i))− pi(v
′
i, v
−i);
⇔ pi(v) ≤ pi(v
′, v−i) +
(
vi(ai(v)) − vi(ai(v
′
i, v
−i))
)
. (3)
• A mechanism is envy-free (EF ) if no agent seeks to switch her allocation and payment with another.
I.e., if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and all v:
vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥ vi(aj(v)) − pj(v);
⇔ pi(v) ≤ pj(v) +
(
vi(ai(v)) − vi(aj(v))
)
. (4)
• A mechanism (a, p) is incentive compatible and envy-free (IC ∩ EF ) if (a, p) is both incentive
compatible and envy-free.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is called a VCG mechanism if:
• a(v) ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑m
i=1 vi(ai(v)), and
1Here we deal with indivisible allocations, although our results also extend to divisible allocations with appropriate modifica-
tions.
2In this paper we consider only deterministic mechanisms and can therefore omit the allocation as an argument to the payment
function.
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• pi(v) = hi(v
−i)−
∑
j 6=i vj(aj(v)), where hi does not depend on vi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
It is known that any mechanism whose allocation function a maximizes
∑m
i=1 vi(ai(v)) (social welfare)
is incentive compatible if and only if it is a VCG mechanism (See, e.g., [8], Theorem 9.37). In the following
we will denote by opt an allocation a which maximizes
∑m
i=1 vi(ai(v)).
The Clarke-pivot payment for a VCG mechanism is defined by
hi(v
−i) = max
a′∈A
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
′).
3 VCG with Clarke-pivot payments
A capacitated allocation game has m agents and n items that need to be assigned to the agents. Agent i
is associated with a capacity Ui ≥ 0, denoting the limit on the number of items she can be assigned, and
each item j is associated with a capacity Qj ≥ 0, denoting the number of available copies of item j. The
valuation vi(j) denotes how much agent i values item j, and
∑
j∈S vi(j) is the valuation of agent i to the
bundle S.
A capacitated allocation game has a corresponding bipartite graph G, where every agent 1 ≤ i ≤ m has
a vertex i associated with it on the left side, and every item 1 ≤ j ≤ n has a vertex j associated with it on
the right side. The weight of the edge (i, j) is vi(j). An assignment is a subgraph of G that satisfies the
capacity constraints, i.e. agent i is assigned at most Ui items and item j is assigned to at most Qj agents.
Recall that we denote by opt an assignment of maximum value. We describe opt by a matrix M where Mij
is the number of copies of item j allocated to agent i in opt.
For player i, the graph G−i is constructed by removing the vertex associated with agent i and its incident
edges from G. The assignment with maximum value in G−i is defined by a matrix M−i.
Let M be an assignment (either in G or in G−i for some i.). We denote by Mi r the i’th row of M ,
(Mi1,Mi2, . . . ,Min) which gives the bundle that agent i gets. We define vk(Mi) =
∑n
j=1Mijvk(j) and
v(M) =
∑m
i=1 vi(Mi).
The Clarke-pivot payment of agent k is
pk = v(M
−k)− v(M) + vk(Mk) . (5)
The main result of this section is that in a VCG mechanism with Clarke-pivot payments, no agent will
ever envy a lower-capacity agent. In particular, this says that if all agents have the same capacity, the VCG
mechanism with Clarke-pivot payments is both incentive compatible and envy-free.
The proof of our main result (Theorem 3.1) is given in terms of a factional assignment but also holds for
integral assignments.
Special case of capacitated allocation games, in which there are n items and n agents, and each agent
can get at most a single item was first introduced in a paper by Leonard [5], and was called a permutation
game. Leonard proved Theorem 3.1 for this special case only, and its proof technique does not seem to
generalize for larger capacities. Our proof is different.
Here is our main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a VCG mechanism consisting of an optimal allocation M and Clarke-pivot pay-
ments (5). Then if Ui ≥ Uj , agent i does not envy agent j.
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Let agent 1 and agent 2 be arbitrary two agents such that the capacity of agent 1 is ≥ that of agent 2,
that is U1 ≥ U2.
Let M be an optimal assignment, M−1 an optimal assignment without agent 1, and M−2 some optimal
assignment without agent 2. Agent 1 does not envy agent 2 iff
v1(M1)− p1 ≥ v1(M2)− p2
Based on Equation 5, this is true when:
v1(M1)− (v(M
−1)− v(M) + v1(M1)) =
v(M) − v(M−1) ≥
v1(M2)− (v(M
−2)− v(M) + v2(M2)) =
v1(M2) + v(M) − v(M
−2)− v2(M2)
Rearranging we obtain that agent 1 does not envy agent 2 iff
v(M−2) ≥ v(M−1) + v1(M2)− v2(M2). (6)
We prove the theorem by establishing (6). We use the assignments M and M−1 to construct an assign-
ment D−2 on G−2 such that
v(D−2) ≥ v(M−1) + v1(M2)− v2(M2) . (7)
From the optimality of M−2, v(M−2) ≥ v(D−2), which combined with (7) implies (6).
Given assignments M and M−1, we construct a flow f on an associated bipartite digraph, Gf , with
vertices for every agent and item. We define arcs and flows on arcs in Gf for every agent i and item j:
• If Mij −M−1ij > 0 then Gf includes an arc i→ j with flow fi→j = Mij −M
−1
ij .
• If Mij −M−1ij < 0 then Gf includes an arc j → i with flow fj→i = M
−1
ij −Mij .
• If Mij = M−1ij then Gf contains neither i→ j not j → i.
We define the excess of an agent i in Gf , and the excess of an item j in Gf , to be
exi =
∑
(i→j)∈Gf
fi→j −
∑
(j→i)∈Gf
fj→i =
∑
j
(
Mij −M
−1
ij
)
,
exj =
∑
(j→i)∈Gf
fj→i −
∑
(i→j)∈Gf
fi→j =
∑
i
(
M−1ij −Mij
)
,
respectively.
In other words the excess is the difference between the amount flowing out of the vertex and the amount
flowing into the vertex. Clearly the sum of all excesses is zero. We say that a node is a source if its excess
is positive and we say that a node is a target if its excess is negative.
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Observation 3.2. To summarize,
i is an agent and a source ⇒
0 ≤
∑
j
M−1ij + |exi| =
∑
j
Mij ≤ Ui; (8)
i is an agent and a target ⇒
0 ≤
∑
j
Mij + |exi| =
∑
j
M−1ij ≤ Ui; (9)
j is an item and a source ⇒
0 ≤
∑
i
Mij + |exj | =
∑
i
M−1ij ≤ Qj; (10)
j is an item and a target ⇒
0 ≤
∑
i
M−1ij + |exj | =
∑
i
Mij ≤ Qj . (11)
By the standard flow decomposition theorem we can decompose f into simple paths and cycles where
each path connects a source to a target. Each path and cycle T has a positive flow value f(T ) > 0 associated
with it. Given an arc x→ y, if we sum the values f(T ) of all paths and cycles T including x→ y then we
obtain fx→y.
Notice that M−11j = 0 for all j and therefore f1→j ≥ 0 for all j. It follows that there are no arcs of the
form j → 1 in Gf .
Observation 3.3. For each path P = u1, u2, . . . , ut in flow decomposition Gf , where u1 is a source and ut
is a target, we have f(P ) ≤ min{exu1 , |exut |}.
We define the value of a path or a cycle T = u1, u2, . . . , ut in Gf , to be
v(P ) =
∑
agent ui,
item ui+1
vui(ui+1)−
∑
item ui,
agent ui+1
vui+1(ui).
It is easy to verify that the
∑
T f(T )·v(T ) over all paths and cycles in our decomposition is v(M)−v(M−1).
Lemma 3.4. Without loss of generality, we can assume that M−1 is such that
1. There are no cycles of zero value in Gf .
2. There is no path P = u1, u2, . . . , ut of zero value such that u1 6= 1 is a source and ut is a target.
Proof. Assume that there is a cycle or a path T in the flow decomposition of Gf such that v(T ) = 0. Let x
be the smallest flow along an arc e of T . We modify M−1 as follows: For every agent to item arc i→ j ∈ T
we increase M−1ij by x and for every item to agent arc j → i ∈ T we decrease M
−1
ij by x. Let the resulting
flow be M˜−1.
If T is a cycle then the capacity constraints are clearly preserved. If T is not a cycle, then the capacity
constraints are trivially preserved for all nodes other than u1 and ut. From Equation (8) we know that∑
j
M−1u1j ≤ Uu1 − |exu1 | ≤ Uu1 − x if u1 is an agent.
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Ergo, if u1 is an agent we can increase the allocation of M−1u1u2 by x, while not exceeding the capacity of
agent u1 (Uu1). If u1 is an item, agent u2 can release x units of item u1 without violating any capacity
constraints.
We can similarly see that the capacities constraints of ut are not violated (Equation (11)).
Furthermore v(M˜−1) = v(M−1)−xv(T ) = v(M−1) and if we replace M−1 by M˜−1 then Gf changes
by decreasing the flow along every arc of T by x, and removing arcs whose flow becomes zero (in particular
at least one arc will be removed). This process does not introduce any new edges to Gf .
We repeat the process until Gf does not contain zero cycles or paths as defined.
From now on we assume that M−1 is chosen according to Lemma 3.4 3.
Lemma 3.5. The flow f in Gf does not contain cycles.
Proof. Assume that f contains a cycle C which carries ǫ > 0 flow. Clearly C does not contain agent 1 since
there is not any arc entering agent 1 in Gf .
Assume first that v(C) < 0. Create an assignment M̂ from M by decreasing Mij by ǫ for each agent
to item arc i → j ∈ C and increasing Mij by ǫ for each item to agent arc j → i ∈ C . This can be done
because M −M−1 has a flow of ǫ along the agent to item arc i→ j, so, it must be that Mij ≥ ǫ. Similarly,
M −M−1 has a flow of ǫ along item to agent arcs j → i so it must be the Mij ≤ Ui− ǫ. Since C is a cycle
the assignment M̂ still satisfies the capacity constraints. Furthermore v(M̂ ) = v(M) − ǫv(C) > v(M)
which contradicts the maximality of M .
If v(C) > 0 we create assignment M̂−1 from M−1 as follows. For every item to agent arc j → i ∈ C
we decrease M−1ij by ǫ and for every agent to item arc i→ j ∈ C we increase M
−1
ij by ǫ. This can be done
because M−1 −M has a flow of ǫ along the item to agent arc j → i, so, it must be that M−1ij ≥ ǫ. Since C
is a cycle M̂−1 still satisfies the capacity constraints. Furthermore v(M̂−1) = v(M−1)+ ǫv(C) > v(M−1)
which contradicts the maximality of M−1.
We need to argue that M̂−1 makes no assignment to agent 1, this follows because agent 1 has no
incoming flow in Gf and cannot lie on any cycle.
By assumption, there no cycles of value zero in Gf .
In particular Lemma 3.5 implies that there are no cycles in our flow decomposition.
Lemma 3.6. Agent 1 is the only source node.
Proof. We give a proof by contradiction, assume some other node, u1 6= 1, is a source. Then, there is a flow
path P = u1, u2, . . . ut from that node to a target node ut. Since there are no arcs incoming into vertex 1,
the path P cannot include agent 1.
Let ǫ be the flow along the path P in the flow decomposition.
If v(P ) > 0 define M̂−1ij = M
−1
ij + ǫ for each agent to item arc i → j in P and M̂
−1
ij = M
−1
ij − ǫ for
each item to agent arc j → i in P . For all other item/agent pairs (i, j), let M̂−1ij = M
−1
ij . We have that
v(M̂−1) = v(M−1) + ǫv(P ) > v(M−1)
this would contradict the maximality of M−1 if M̂−1 is a legal assignment.
3Since Equation (7) depends only on the value of M−1 it does not matter which M−1 we work with
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If v(P ) < 0 define M̂ij = Mij − ǫ for each agent to item arc i → j in P and M̂ij = Mij + ǫ for each
item to agent arc j → i in P . For all other item/agent pairs (i, j), let M̂ij = Mij . We have that
v(M̂ ) = v(M) − ǫv(P ) > v(M)
which contradicts the maximality of M .
We still need to argue that the assignment M̂−1 (if v(P ) > 0) and the assignment M̂ (if v(P ) < 0) are
legal. Because P has a flow of ǫ, M−1ij ≥ ǫ for each item to agent arc j → i along P , and Mij ≥ ǫ for each
agent to item arc i→ j along P .
We also worry about exceeding capacities at the endpoints of P , since the size of assignments of
agents/items that are internal to the path do not change.
We increase the capacity of u1 while constructing M−1 only if u1 is an agent, and increase the capacity
of ut while constructing M−1 only if it is an item. By Observation 3.2 this is legal. A similar argument
shows that in M̂ the assignment of u1 and ut is smaller than their capacities.
According to the way we choose M−1, it cannot be that v(P ) = 0 and that P carries a flow in Gf .
In particular Lemma 3.6 implies that all the paths in our flow decomposition start at agent 1.
We construct D−2 from M−1 as follows.
1. Stage I: Initially, D−2 := M−1.
2. Stage II: For each item j let x = min{M2j ,M−12j }. Set D
−2
2j := M
−1
2j − x and D
−2
1j := x.
3. Stage III: For each flow path P in the flow decomposition of Gf that contains agent 2 we consider
the prefix of the path up to agent 2. For each agent to item arc i → j in this prefix we set D−2ij :=
D−2ij + f(P ), and for each item to agent arc j → i in this prefix we set D
−2
ij := D
−2
ij − f(P ).
It is easy to verify that D−2 indeed does not assign any item to agent 2. Also, the assignment to agent 1 in
D−2 is of the same size as the assignment to agent 2 in M−1. Since U1 ≥ U2, D−2 is a legal assignment.
Lemma 3.7. The assignment D−2 satisfies Equation (7).
Proof. Rearranging Equation (7)
v(D−2) ≥ v(M−1) (12)
+
n∑
j=1
(v1(j) − v2(j)) ·min(M2j ,M
−1
2j ) (13)
+
∑
j|M2j>M
−1
2j
(v1(j) − v2(j)) · (M2j −M
−1
2j ). (14)
At the end of stage I, we have D−2 = M−1 and so the inequality above at line (12) (without adding (13)
and (14)) holds trivially. It is also easy to verify that at the end of stage II, the inequality above that spans
(12) and (13) but without (14) holds. Finally, at the end of stage III, the full inequality in (12), (13) and (14)
will hold as we explain next.
Consider an item j such that M2j > M−12j . In Gf we have an arc 2→ j such that f2→j = M2j −M
−1
2j .
Therefore in the flow decomposition we must have paths P1, . . . , Pℓ all containing 2→ j such that
ℓ∑
k=1
f(Pk) = f2→j = M2j −M
−1
2j (15)
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Let P̂k be the prefix of Pk up to agent 2. Consider the cycle C consisting of P̂k followed by 2 → j and
j → 1. It has to be that that value of this cycle is non-negative. (Otherwise, construct M̂ by decreasing each
agent to item arc i → j on the cycle M̂ij = Mij − ǫ and increasing each item to agent arc j → i on the
cycle M̂ij = Mij + ǫ. It follows, that v(M̂ ) = v(M) − ǫv(C) > v(M) in contradiction of maximality of
M. The matching v(M̂) is legal since it preserves capacities and decreases assignment associated with arcs
with flow on them.)
Therefore,
v(P̂k) + v2(j)− v1(j) ≥ 0;
⇒ v(P̂k) ≥ (v1(j)− v2(j));
⇒ f(Pk)v(P̂k) ≥ f(Pk)(v1(j)− v2(j));
⇒
ℓ∑
k=1
(
f(Pk)v(P̂k)
)
≥ (v1(j)− v2(j))
ℓ∑
k=1
f(Pk).
Substituting Equation (15) into the above gives us that
ℓ∑
k=1
(
f(Pk)v(P̂k)
)
≥
(
v1(j)− v2(j)
)(
M2j −M
−1
2j
)
. (16)
The left hand side of equation (16) is exactly the gain in value of the matching when applying stage III
to the paths P̂1, . . . , P̂ℓ during the construction of D−2 above. The right hand side is the term which we add
in Equation (14).
To conclude the proof of Lemma 3.7, we note that stage III may also deal with other paths that start at
agent 1 and terminate at agent 2. Such paths must have value ≥ 0 and thus can only increase the value of
the matching D−2. (Otherwise we can build assignment M̂ , such that v(M̂ ) > v(M) by decreasing Mij by
ǫ for each arc i → j ∈ P and increasing Mij by ǫ for each arc j → i ∈ P as we did before. The matching
M̂ is legal since it preserves capacities on inner nodes of the path, decreases only arcs with flow on them,
Mij > ǫ. Capacity of a source agent node can be increased according to Observation 3.2.)
Corollary 3.8. If all agent capacities are equal then the VCG allocation with Clarke-pivot payments is
envy-free.
Do Clarke-pivot payments work also under heterogeneous capacities? The answer is no. This follows
since in the next section we show that any mechanism that is both incentive compatible and envy-free must
have positive transfers, and Clarke-pivot payments do not.
4 Heterogeneous capacities:
IC∩EF payments imply
positive transfers
Consider an arbitrary VCG mechanism. Let
opt =< opt1, opt2, . . . , optn >
denote the allocation and let
pi = hi(v
−i)− v−i(opt) (17)
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be the payments, where
v−i(opt) =
∑
1 ≤ j ≤ n
j 6= i
vj(optj).
Let v(opt) =
∑n
j=1 vj(optj) and let
opt−i =< opt−11 , opt
−1
2 , . . . , opt
−i
i−1, ∅, opt
−i
i+1, . . . , optn >,
be the allocation maximizing
v−i(opt−i) =
∑
1 ≤ j ≤ n
j 6= i
vj(opt
−i
j ).
We substitute the VCG payments (17) into the envy-free conditions (4) and obtain that i does not envy
j if and only if
vi(optj)− pj ≤ vi(opti)− pi
⇔ pi − pj ≤ vi(opti)− vi(optj)
⇔ hi(v
−i)− v−i(opt)−
(
hj(v
−j)− v−j(opt)
)
≤ vi(opti)− vi(optj)
⇔ hi(v
−i)− hj(v
−j)
≤ v−i(opt)− v−j(opt) + vi(opti)− vi(optj)
⇔ hi(v
−i)− hj(v
−j)
≤ v(opt)− (v(opt)− vj(optj))− vi(optj)
⇔ hi(v
−i)− hj(v
−j) ≤ vj(optj)− vi(optj). (18)
Theorem 4.1. Consider a capacitated allocation game with heterogeneous capacities such that the number
of items exceeds the smallest agent capacity. There is no mechanism that simultaneously optimizes the social
welfare, is IC∩EF, and has no positive transfers (the mechanism never pays the agents). That is, any IC∩EF
mechanism has some valuations v for which the mechanism pays an agent.
Note that the conditions on the capacities of the agents and the number of items are necessary – If capac-
ities are homogeneous or the total supply of items is at most the minimum agent capacity then Clarke-pivot
payments, that are known to be incentive compatible, individually rational, and have no positive transfers,
are also envy-free.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 4.1. We start with a capacitated allocation game with two
agents and two items where agent i has capacity i (i = 1, 2). We then generalize the proof to arbitrary
heterogeneous games.
To ease the notation we abbreviate in the rest of the paper vi(j) to vij .
We partition the valuations into three sets A, B1, and B2 as follows (we omit cases with ties).4
4The optimal allocation that maximizes social welfare is uniquely defined when there are no ties. Valuations v’s with ties form
a lower dimensional measure 0 set. It suffices to consider valuations without ties for both existence or non-existence claims of IC
or EF payments. This is clear for non-existence, for existence, the payments for a v with ties is defined as the limit when we
approach this point through v’s without ties that result in the same allocation. Clearly IC and EF properties carry over, also IR and
nonnegativity of payments.
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• (A) v21 > v11 and v22 > v12. For these valuations in an optimal allocation agent 2 obtains the bundle
{1, 2} and agent 1 obtains the empty bundle.
• (B1) v11 − v21 > max{0, v12 − v22}. For these valuations in an optimal allocation item 1 is assigned
to agent 1 and item 2 to agent 2.
• (B2) v12 − v22 > max{0, v11 − v21}. For these valuations in an optimal allocation item 1 is assigned
to agent 2 and item 2 to agent 1.
Substituting the above in (18) we obtain that for v ∈ B1, agent 1 does not envy agent 2 if and only if
h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v2(opt2)− v1(opt2) = v22 − v12 .
Agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if
h2(v1)− h1(v2) ≤ v1(opt1)− v2(opt1) = v11 − v21 .
Combining we obtain that there is no envy for v ∈ B1, if and only if
v21 − v11 ≤ h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v22 − v12 . (19)
For a fixed ǫ > 0, and x > 5ǫ, the valuation v such that v11 = x + 3ǫ, v12 = x + ǫ, v21 = v22 = 0 is
clearly in B1. Substituting in (19) we obtain
− (x+ 3ǫ) ≤ h1(0, 0) − h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ −(x+ ǫ) (20)
.
The valuation v such that v11 = x+3ǫ, v12 = x+ ǫ, v21 = x+ ǫ, and v22 = x is also clearly in B1 and
from (19) we obtain
x+ ǫ− (x+ 3ǫ) ≤ h1(x+ ǫ, x)− h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ x− (x+ ǫ)
hence
− 2ǫ ≤ h1(x+ ǫ, x)− h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ −ǫ . (21)
Combining (20) and (21) we obtain
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≤ h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ)− ǫ ≤ h1(0, 0) + x+ 3ǫ (22)
The no positive transfers requirement is that for any v,
h1(v2) ≥ v2(opt2) . (23)
Consider now the valuations v such that v21 = x+ǫ, v22 = x, v11 = v12 = x−ǫ. Clearly, v ∈ A (agent 2 gets
both items), hence v2(opt2) = 2x−ǫ. Substituting this and (22) in (23) we obtain 2x−ǫ ≤ h1(0, 0)+x+3ǫ,
hence h1(0, 0) ≥ x−4ǫ. Clearly, for valuations with large enough x we obtain a contradiction, that is, there
exist valuations where the mechanism pays an agent.
Heterogeneous capacities, multiple agents and items: Let c be the smallest agent capacity and assume it
is the capacity of agent 1. Let agent 2 be any agent with capacity > c. There are ≥ c + 1 items. It suffices
to consider restricted valuation matrices v where vij = 0 when i > 2 or when j > c + 1 and vij ≡ vi2 for
i = 1, 2 and 2 ≤ j ≤ c+1. We partition these valuations into four sets A, B1, B+1 , B2, as follows (we omit
cases with ties and only define the assignment of items 1, . . . , c+ 1):
11
• (A) v21 > v11 and v22 > v12. For these valuations in an optimal allocation agent 2 obtains the bundle
{1, . . . , c+ 1}.
• (B1) v11 > v21 and v12 < v22. For these valuations in an optimal allocation items 1 is assigned to
agent 1 and items 2, . . . , c+ 1 to agent 2.
• (B+1 ) v11−v21 > v12−v22 and v12 > v22. For these valuations in an optimal allocation items 1, . . . , c
are assigned to agent 1 and item c+ 1 is assigned to agent 2.
• (B2) v12 − v22 > max{0, v11 − v21}. For these valuations in an optimal allocation item 1 is assigned
to agent 2 and items 2, . . . , c+ 1 to agent 1.
Substituting the above in (18) we obtain that for v ∈ B+1 , agent 1 does not envy agent 2 if and only if
h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v2(opt2)− v1(opt2) = v22 − v12 .
Agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if
h2(v1)− h1(v2) ≤ v1(opt1)− v2(opt1)
= v11 + (c− 1)v12 − v21 − (c− 1)v22 .
Combining we obtain that there is no envy for v ∈ B+1 , if and only if
v21 + (c− 1)v22 − v11 − (c− 1)v12 ≤ h1(v2)− h2(v1) ≤ v22 − v12 . (24)
For a fixed ǫ > 0 and for x > ǫ, the valuation v such that v11 = x+ 3ǫ, v12 = x+ ǫ, v21 = v22 = 0 is
clearly in B+1 . For such v the left hand side of (24) is
v21 + (c− 1)v22 − v11 − (c− 1)v12
= −(x+ 3ǫ)− (c− 1)(x+ ǫ)
= −cx− (c+ 2)ǫ
Substituting in (24) we obtain
− cx− (c+ 2)ǫ ≤ h1(0, 0) − h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ −(x+ ǫ) . (25)
The valuation v such that v11 = x + 3ǫ, v12 = x + ǫ, v21 = x + ǫ, and v22 = x is also clearly in B+1 .
For such v the left hand side of (24) is
v21 + (c− 1)v22 − v11 − (c− 1)v12
= x+ ǫ+ (c− 1)x− (x+ 3ǫ)− (c− 1)(x+ ǫ)
= −(c+ 1)ǫ
From (24) we obtain
− (c+ 1)ǫ ≤ h1(x+ ǫ, x)− h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ) ≤ −ǫ. (26)
Combining (25) and (26) we obtain,
h1(x+ ǫ, x) ≤ h2(x+ 3ǫ, x+ ǫ)− ǫ
≤ h1(0, 0) + cx+ (c+ 2)ǫ− ǫ
= h1(0, 0) + cx+ (c+ 1)ǫ
For valuations v21 = x+ ǫ, v22 = x, v11 = v12 = x− ǫ, we clearly have v ∈ A (agent 2 gets all items),
hence v2(opt2) = (c+ 1)x− (c+ 1)ǫ.
For a sufficiently large x (relative to ǫ and h1(0, 0)), h1(v2) = h1(x+ǫ, x) ≤ h1(0, 0)+cx+(c+1)ǫ <
(c+ 1)x− (c+ 1)ǫ = v2(opt2), which contradicts the no positive transfers requirement (23).
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5 2 agents, Public Capacities
In this section we assume that capacities are public and derive IC ∩ EF payments for any game with two
players.
Lemma 5.1. Any 2-player capacitated allocation game with public capacities has an IC∩EF individually
rational mechanism.
Proof. Let ci be the capacity of player i and assume without loss of generality that c1 ≤ c2. For a vector
(x1, x2 . . .) let topb{x} be the set of the b largest entries in x. We show that
h1(v2) =
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j
and
h2(v1) =
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j
give VCG payments which are envy-free.
It suffices to show that for {i, j} = {1, 2},
hi(v
−i)− hj(v
−j) ≤ vj(optj)− vi(optj) .
That is, ∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j ≤ v2(opt2)− v1(opt2) (27)
and ∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j −
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j ≤ v1(opt1)− v2(opt1). (28)
Assume first that the number of items is exactly c1 + c2. In the optimal solution, player 1 will get the c1
items that maximize v1j − v2j and player 2 will get the c2 items that minimize this difference.
We establish (28) as follows∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j −
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j
≤
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
(v1j − v2j)
≤
∑
j∈topc1{v1−v2}
(v1j − v2j)
=
∑
j∈opt1
(v1j − v2j) = v1(opt1)− v2(opt1) .
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We establish (27) as follows ∑
j∈topc1{v2}
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1}
v1j
≤
∑
j∈topc1{v2}
(v2j − v1j)
≤
∑
j∈topc1{v2−v1}
(v2j − v1j)
≤
∑
j∈opt2
v2j −
∑
j∈topc1{v1(opt2)}
v1j
where v1(opt2) is the vector of the values of player 1 to the items player 2 gets in the optimal solution.
If there are fewer than c1 + c2 items, we add “dummy” items with valuations v1j = v2j = 0 and the
lemma follows from the previous argument for the case with c1 + c2 items.
If there are more than c1 + c2 items then consider the set of c1 + c2 items than participate in the optimal
solution. We now observe that (27) and (28) only involve items that participate in the optimal solution
(topc2{v2} and topc1{v1} must both be included in the optimal solution).
6 2 agents, 2 items, Private Capacities
In this section, valuations and capacities are private. We give VCG payments which are envy-free and
individually rational for any game with two agents and two items. We specify the payments by giving the
functions h1(v2, c2) and h2(v1, c1). Note that with two items, all ci ≥ 2 are equivalent, therefore we only
need to consider capacities ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
We show that the following give envy-free payments
h1(v2, c2) =
{
max(v21, v22) c2 ∈ {1, 2}
0 c2 = 0
h2(v1, c1) =
{
max(v11, v12) c1 ∈ {1, 2}
0 c1 = 0
The payments are envy-free if and only if
δ12 = h1(v2, c2)− h2(v1, c1) ≤ v2(opt2)− v1(opt2),
δ21 = h2(v1, c1)− h1(v2, c2) ≤ v1(opt1)− v2(opt1).
The conditions when {c1, c2} = {1, 2} were worked out in the previous section and the correctness for
h1(v2, 2) and h2(v1, 1) carries over (and symmetrically, if we switch capacities of the agents). Consider the
following remaining cases.
• c1 = c2 = 2: agent 1 does not envy agent 2 if and only if:
h1(v2, 2)− h2(v1, 2) ≤

v21 + v22 − v11 − v12 if v21 > v11, v22 > v12
v22 − v12 if v21 < v11, v22 > v12
v21 − v11 if v21 > v11, v22 < v12
0 if v21 < v11, v22 < v12
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Symmetrically, agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if:
h2(v1, 2)− h1(v2, 2) ≤

v11 + v12 − v21 − v22 if v11 > v21, v12 > v22
v12 − v22 if v11 < v21, v12 > v22
v11 − v21 if v11 > v21, v12 < v22
0 if v11 < v21, v12 < v22
Combining, we obtain the condition
min{v21 − v11, 0} +min{v22 − v12, 0}
≤ h1(v2, 2) − h2(v1, 2)
≤ max{v21 − v11, 0}+max{v22 − v12, 0}. (29)
We now show that our particular h’s satisfy (29). It suffices to establish one of the inequalities: We have
v21 ≤ max{v11, v12}+max{v21 − v11, 0}
v22 ≤ max{v11, v12}+max{v22 − v12, 0}
Combining, we obtain the desired relation:
max{v21, v22}
≤ max{v11, v12}+max{v21 − v11, 0} +max{v22 − v12, 0} .
• c1 = c2 = 1: agent 1 does not envy agent 2 if and only if:
h1(v2, 1)− h2(v1, 1)
≤
{
v22 − v12 v11 + v22 > v12 + v21
v21 − v11 v11 + v22 < v12 + v21
Symmetrically, agent 2 does not envy agent 1 if and only if:
h2(v1, 1)− h1(v2, 1)
≤
{
v12 − v22 v21 + v12 > v22 + v11
v11 − v21 v21 + v12 < v22 + v11
Combining, we obtain
min{v22 − v12, v21 − v11}
≤ h1(v2, 1) − h2(v1, 1)
≤ max{v22 − v12, v21 − v11} (30)
We now show that our particular h’s satisfy (30). It suffices to establish one of the inequalities: We have
v21 ≤ max{v11, v12}+ v21 − v11
v22 ≤ max{v11, v12}+ v22 − v12}
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Combining, we obtain the desired relation:
max{v21, v22} ≤ max{v11, v12}+max{v21 − v11, v22 − v12} .
• c1 = 1, c2 = 0: No agent envies the other if and only if
h1(v2, 0)− h2(v1, 1) ≤ 0
h2(v1, 1)− h1(v2, 0) ≤ max{v11, v12}
Combining, we obtain
−max{v11, v12} ≤ h1(v2, 0) − h2(v1, 1) ≤ 0 (31)
Symmetrically, when c1 = 0, c2 = 1:
−max{v21, v22} ≤ h2(v1, 0) − h1(v2, 1) ≤ 0 (32)
Our particular h’s trivially satisfy (31) and (32).
• c1 = 2, c2 = 0: No agent envies the other if and only if
h1(v2, 0)− h2(v1, 2) ≤ 0
h2(v1, 2)− h1(v2, 0) ≤ v11 + v12
Combining, we obtain
− v11 − v12 ≤ h1(v2, 0) − h2(v1, 2) ≤ 0 (33)
Symmetrically, when c1 = 0, c2 = 2:
− v21 − v22 ≤ h2(v1, 0) − h1(v2, 2) ≤ 0 (34)
Our particular h’s trivially satisfy (33) and (34).
7 Conclusion and open problems
We have begun to study truthful and envy free mechanisms for maximizing social welfare for the capacitated
allocation problem.
There is much left open, for example:
1. Is there a truthful and envy free mechanism (with positive transfers) for the capacitated allocation
problem (arbitrary capacities):
(a) With public capacities and more than two agents.
(b) With private capacities for more than 2 agents and 2 items?
2. How well can we approximate the social welfare by a mechanism that is incentive-compatible, envy-
free, invidually rational, and without positive transfers for capacitated allocations ?
3. Noam Nisan has observed that for superadditive valuations, there may be no mechanism that is both
truthful and envy free. We conjecture that one can obtain mechanisms that are both truthful and envy
free for subadditive valuations.
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